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KEYNOTE:
MOTIVATING PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE:
THE ROLE OF THE EFFICIENCY GAP
Michael P. Vandenbergh*
The topic of this symposium, “Environmental
Sustainability and Private Governance,” is important and timely.
In response to the shrinking federal role in environmental
protection, many policy advocates have focused on the role of
states and cities, but this symposium focuses on another
important source of sustainability initiatives: the private sector,
including corporations, households, civic and cultural
organizations, religious organizations, private hospitals, colleges
and universities, and other organizations. States, cities, and
other subnational government responses are increasingly
important, but the limited geographic reach of subnational
governments constrains their ability to address many
environmental problems. For instance, although twenty states
have set quantified greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets and
are adopting policies to reduce emissions, almost two-thirds of
United States GHG emissions arise from the thirty states that do
not have GHG targets.1 Private governance initiatives offer an
opportunity to fill the gap. 2

I. THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO
CLIMATE CHANGE

*

David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Climate Change Research
Network, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land Use Program, Vanderbilt
University Law School. Many thanks to Sara Rollet Gosman and the student editors of the
Arkansas Law Review for organizing the 2017 Environmental Sustainability and Private
Governance Symposium. Claudia Stantzyk-Guzek and Isaac Gabella provided valuable
research assistance.
1. Rocky Mountain Institute, Mapping Non-Federal Action on Climate Change:
High-Level Survey of State, City and Corporate Commitments 3 (June 9, 2017).
2. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 129, 141-47 (2013) (defining “private environmental governance” and related
terms).
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Understanding the role of the private sector is thus essential
to exploiting the full range of options for achieving
sustainability. In a new book, physicist Jonathan Gilligan and I
address the role that the private sector can play in responding to
climate change, which we view as the principal threat to
sustainability.3 We make two core arguments.
First, we show why efforts to mobilize support for climate
mitigation by reframing the threat posed by climate change are
falling short.4 In our view, much of the current climate
skepticism and opposition to government climate mitigation has
little to do with the certainty or severity of the problem, and
recent efforts to reframe the problem to emphasize different
aspects of the threat have barely moved the dial on support for
government-mitigation measures.5 Whether the new framing
emphasizes the severity of heat waves and other near-term
effects, the importance of sea-level rise and other long-term
effects, implications for social justice, or other aspects of the
climate problem, efforts to emphasize different aspects of the
climate threat have not produced a major shift in support for
mitigation in the United States over the last two decades.
We argue for a new approach to framing that is grounded in
the idea that beliefs about the climate problem are strongly
influenced by concerns about the anticipated response to the
problem.6 Recent polling shows that between two-thirds and
three-quarters of the U.S. population believe that big
government is the biggest problem we face. 7 If this large
segment of the U.S. population also equates climate mitigation
with big government, which it likely does, we should not be
surprised that many people engage in confirmation bias and
3. See generally MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND
POLITICS: T HE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO C LIMATE C HANGE (2017).
4. Id. at Preface, Ch. 1, Ch. 7.
5. Id.
6. See id. at i-ii. Psychologists have described a related phenomenon as “solution
aversion.” See Troy H. Campbell & Aaron C. Kay, Solution Aversion: On the Relation
Between Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, 107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 809,
809 (2014) (introducing and discussing “solution aversion”); see also Andrew C. Revkin,
How ‘Solution Aversion’ and Global Warming Prescriptions Polarize the Climate Debate,
N.Y. TIMES: DOT E ARTH (Nov. 10, 2014, 4:01 PM), https:// dotearth. blogs. nytimes.
com/2014/11/10/how-solution-aversion-and-global-warming-prescriptions-polarize-theclimate-debate/ [https://perma.cc/DSM7-ZRCH].
7. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at i.
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motivated reasoning, tossing out climate-science information
that is inconsistent with their worldview and rejecting
government climate-mitigation measures. In short, our first
point is that when seeking to understand belief in climate
science and support for climate mitigation, the framing of how
we can respond to climate change is as important as the framing
of the problem itself. This conclusion, in turn, suggests that the
subject of this symposium— private responses to climate
change—may provide a way to bypass worldview-based
concerns. In turn, this approach may garner more widespread
support for climate mitigation among conservatives and
libertarians than an exclusive focus on government action,
whether federal, state, or local.
Second, we argue that the private sector can provide
meaningful levels of emissions reductions: Private initiatives
can reduce global carbon emissions by a billion tons per year
over the next decade. 8 The billion-ton annual total includes
roughly half- a-billion tons of reductions from the corporate
sector and half-a- billion tons from the household sector. 9
Although the other private actors mentioned above (e.g.,
religious organizations, universities, and civic and cultural
organizations) can also make major reductions, to simplify the
analysis we have not included reductions from other private
actors in our billion-ton total.
An example of a private initiative that has already reduced
GHG emissions is the effort by CDP (formerly the Carbon
Disclosure Project) to push for carbon disclosure from major
corporations by leveraging the interest in GHG emissions
reductions by global investors with more than $100 trillion in
investments.10 CDP’s initiatives increase the pressure on major
corporations to disclose and reduce emissions, and, although it is
difficult to demonstrate causation, CDP has argued that
participating companies have reduced emissions by hundreds of
millions of tons. This symposium is being conducted near
Bentonville, Arkansas, so it is also appropriate to mention
Walmart’s 2010 announcement that it would work with the
8. See id. at Ch. 1.
9. Id.
10. See id. at Ch. 5 (identifying initiatives that target corporate GHG emissions).
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Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) to reduce 20 million metric
tons of GHGs from its supply chain, an effort that resulted in a
28.2 million ton reduction.11 More recently, Walmart made a
commitment, working with EDF and the World Wildlife Fund,
to achieve a billion tons of emissions reductions from its supply
chain by 2030.12 Although private initiatives that target
households have achieved less notoriety than those that target
corporations, these initiatives have included efforts to increase
the uptake of efficient LED lightbulbs, efforts to reduce
electricity demand through providing comparative information
about electricity use in monthly power bills, efforts by
companies to increase employees’ household energy efficiency,
and others.13 According to a recent study by several economists,
in the last several years the U.S. household sector has reduced
electricity use for the first time since World War II, and the
efficiencies from increased uptake of LED lightbulbs alone are
great enough to explain this major shift in household electricity
use.14
The billion tons of annual GHG reductions that can be
achieved through private initiatives will not solve the climate
problem or displace the need for a strong government response,
but these reductions are roughly equal to eliminating all of the
emissions of any one of the top ten emitting countries other than
China and the United States. Reductions of this magnitude will
buy time, reduce the cost and intrusiveness of more
comprehensive government climate-mitigation laws and
policies, and reduce the risk that the planet will pass tipping
points in the interim. If properly selected and implemented,
private initiatives also can facilitate rather than undermine
support for federal, state, and local efforts.
11. See Walmart Marks Fulfillment of Key Global Responsibility Commitments,
WALMART (Nov. 17, 2015), https:// news.walmart.com/ news-archive/ 2015/ 11/ 17/
walmart- marks- fulfillment- of- key- global- responsibility- commitments
[https://perma.cc/NF64-432H].
12. See Walmart Launches Project Gigaton to Reduce Emissions in Company’s
Supply Chain, WALMART (Apr. 19, 2017), https://news.walmart.com/ 2017/ 04/ 19/
walmart-launches-project-gigaton-to-reduce-emissions-in-companys-supply-chain
[https://perma.cc/APH7-GKHV].
13. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at Ch. 6 (identifying initiatives
that target household GHG emissions).
14.
See Lucas W. Davis, Evidence of a Decline in Electricity Use by U.S.
Households, 37 ECON. BULL. 1098, 1098, 1100-01 (2017).
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II. THE EFFICIENCY GAP: PERSPECTIVES FROM
ENGINEERING AND ECONOMICS
Although the private response to climate change can
provide a way to bypass the political gridlock on the climate
issue, the emergence of private governance raises questions
about the relationship between private action and public action,
the extent to which private action yields genuine emissions
reductions as opposed to greenwashing, and the distributional
justice issues arising from private climate initiatives. My focus
here, though, is on why it is plausible to argue that private actors
can be induced to make major emissions reductions. Private
advocacy groups and other private organizations lack the
coercive power and resources available to governments, so why
is it plausible to assume that major emissions reductions can be
achieved from the private sector in the absence of government
action? What types of motivation can private climate initiatives
create or rely on induce large-scale emissions reductions from
private actors?
One part of the answer is that private initiatives can induce
carbon-emissions reductions by closing the energy-efficiency
gap. For my purposes here, the energy-efficiency gap is the
difference between the energy-efficiency measures that
corporations and households could take at negative cost and the
measures that they have actually taken to date. 15 Although
anthropogenic GHG emissions occur from non-energy-related
activities (e.g., use of nitrogen-containing fertilizers and
refrigerants), the vast majority of GHG emissions are the result
of fossil-fuel-based energy use, so reductions in energy use tend
to correspond to reductions in GHG emissions.
If many situations exist in which corporations and
households can profit by reducing energy use, private initiatives
that target corporations and households should not need the
coercive power or resources of government to induce them to act
or to accelerate the speed with which they act. Instead, they
15. In their 2012 article, Allcott and Greenstone define the Energy Efficiency Gap
as the “wedge between the cost-minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level
actually realized.” Hunt Allcott & Michael Greenstone, “Is There an Energy Efficiency
Gap”, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2012).
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simply need to address the reasons why those efficiencies have
not already been achieved. This may be no small task, and selfinterest is not the only motivation for households and
corporations, but it is far easier to harness self-interest than to
work against it. A large efficiency gap thus makes it more likely
that private initiatives could yield substantial reductions in
carbon emissions even absent government action. These
initiatives may induce additional efficiency steps by providing
information about the efficiency opportunity, overcoming
behavioral failures, better aligning incentives between principals
and agents, or otherwise overcoming barriers to actions that are
in the target’s interest. At the same time, if the efficiency gap is
small, the opportunity for private initiatives is also small.
Motivations other than financial gains can drive GHG emissions
reductions by corporations and households even absent a large
efficiency gap (e.g., reputation, employee recruitment and
morale, investor and lender pressure, anticipation of future
regulations, and social and personal norms),16 but the magnitude
of the private opportunity is reduced if the efficiency gap is
small. I focus here on corporations and households, but the
efficiency gap is also important for other private sector actors,
and for states, cities, and other public-sector energy users as
well.
The efficiency gap is thus an alluring idea because it maps
out the path to an environmental and economic win-win that can
increase the size of the private climate-governance opportunity.
The efficiency gap could exist because private actors fail to
account for some of the social costs of energy use (often referred
to as energy use externalities, such as the climate harms from
carbon emissions associated with energy use) or because private
actors fail to make investments in energy efficiency that are
profitable to them (often referred to as investment
inefficiencies).17 Energy use externalities (e.g., the harms of
climate change not accounted for when GHGs are emitted) are
important for those who design private initiatives, since better
understanding where energy use externalities exist may help
private policymakers direct private initiatives toward areas that
16. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Drivers of Corporate Climate Mitigation, ENVTL.
F., Jan.-Feb. 2018, at 29, 29.
17. Allcott & Greenstone, supra note 15, at 4.
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are important for climate mitigation. In addition, corporate
managers’ and households’ concerns about social benefits (such
as reducing the climate effects of GHG emissions) may motivate
some behavior change, but social benefits typically will be less
likely to motivate behavior change than more direct corporate or
personal benefits. I focus on investment efficiencies here
because my focus is on the extent to which direct energy savings
can be achieved by corporations and households.
Uncertainty about the efficiency gap exists in large part
because engineers and economists take different approaches to
assessing the size of the gap and arrive at very different
conclusions, yet they rarely engage with one another. As a
result, limited work has been done to bridge the disciplinary
differences and to understand which aspects of each camp’s
approach provide the most accurate view of the size and
composition of the gap, what types of initiatives are most
promising, and how much effort should be directed toward
efficiency-based initiatives as opposed to other climate
measures. The first camp, which is made up principally of
engineers, often adopts a social perspective (including energy
use externalities in the analysis) and leverages the existence of
available energy-efficient measures to argue that a substantial,
actionable gap exists. The leading study that takes an
engineering perspective is the 2009 McKinsey & Co. report
Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy.18 The aim of
the report is to determine the social potential for cost-effective
energy savings that would result if firms and households were to
invest in available, energy-efficient technology.
In this
approach, investments are optimal if benefits exceed costs,
regardless of who bears the investment costs and to whom
savings accrue. The value of investments are quantified using
net present value (NPV) calculations.
The NPV of an
investment equals the present, or discounted, value of energy
savings subtracted from the costs of investment, installation and

18. See HANNAH C HOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (2009), https:// www.sallan.org/ pdf-docs/
MCKINSEY_ US_ energy_ efficiency.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW67-G4RX].

356

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:2

operation costs for example. 19 The inherent uncertainty of the
future parameters is accounted for by modeling potential
investments against a variety of parameter sets.20 The 2009
McKinsey & Co. study considered 675 investment opportunities
in the United States across a 10-year period from 2010-2020.
The report’s preferred model found the potential to reduce
annual energy consumption by approximately 23% of projected
demand in 2020 while saving $130 billion (2009 value).21 A
number of other engineering studies have reached similar
conclusions.22
Many of these studies suggest that large inefficiencies
exist, but their value for our analysis here is limited to the extent
they focus on the net social savings (including both energy use
externalities and investment inefficiencies), not the savings to
the companies or households that would be the targets of these
kinds of initiatives (including only investment inefficiencies).
19.
Id. at v. Discounting future values⎯be they costs or savings⎯requires
estimating a set of future parameters, including energy prices, carbon taxes, interest rates
and technological learning rates.
20. Id. at xii. For other studies, see, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOWCARBON ECONOMY: VERSION 2 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST
CURVE (2009), https:// www.mckinsey.com/ ~/ media/ mckinsey/ dotcom/client_service
/sustainability/ cost%20curve% 20pdfs/ pathways_lowcarbon_economy_version2.ashx
[https://perma.cc/4LFL-JAGZ]; STEVEN N ADEL & T HERESE L ANGER, COMMENTS ON “IS
THERE AN ENERGY EFFICIENCY GAP?” (2012), http://aceee.org/files/pdf/whitepaper/comments-on-is-there-an-energy-efficiency-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E73-5YS8];
NAT’L ACTION P LAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AS A LOW-COST
RESOURCE FOR ACHIEVING CARBON EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS §§ 4-1 to 4-3 (2009), https://
www.epa.gov/ sites/ production/ files/ 2015-08/ documents/ ee_ and_ carbon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G264-LLKK]; DAN YORK ET AL., NEW HORIZONS FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENCY:MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES TO REACH H IGHER ELECTRICITY S AVINGS BY 2030
(2015), http:// aceee.org/ research- report/u1507 [https://perma.cc/739T-RQB5]; Andy
Gouldson et al., Accelerating Low-Carbon Development in the World’s Cities (Sept. 2015)
(working paper), http:// newclimateeconomy.report/ 2015/ wp-content/ uploads/ sites/
3/2015/09/NCE2015_workingpaper_cities_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHA8-RJAB].
21. GRANADE ET AL., supra note 18, at 7-8.
22. See, e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE F UND & CARBON D ISCLOSURE PROJECT, THE 3%
SOLUTION: DRIVING PROFITS THROUGH C ARBON REDUCTION 6 (2013),
https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/575/files/original/The_3_Percent_Solutio
n_-_June_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX3M-F5J7] (noting the potential for private sector
action to reduce global carbon emissions by 3% per year). A 2015 study by York et al.,
supra note 20, examined the potential for reducing electricity use in the United States
between 2015 and 2030. Profiling 18 market ready measures, the study estimated that their
use would reduce electricity consumption by 22% in 2030. Id. at 9. Most measures would
cost less per kWh-of-saved-energy than it would take to supply the same amount by
building new natural-gas-fired plants. Id. at vi-vii.
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In other words, they address whether it would be in the interest
of society generally, not in the specific interest of the targeted
corporations or households, for these actions to be taken. 23
Nevertheless, the large size of the gap identified by these studies
and the large contribution of investment inefficiencies to the
analysis 24 suggests that even if these studies include energy use
externalities and are somewhat optimistic, a substantial energyefficiency gap may exist based only on investment
inefficiencies.
The second camp, which is made up principally of
economists, often focuses on the extent to which an efficiency
gap exists based on investment inefficiencies rather than energyuse externalities. By drawing attention to the private investment
decisions faced by firms and households, economists shed light
on the opportunity for win-win behavior changes and clarify the
barriers to socially-preferred investments in energy efficiency
that engineers may overlook. The studies that emerge from this
camp begin with the assumption that private actors typically
behave rationally and function in markets that are generally
efficient, and they look for departures from these assumptions
that might support an efficiency gap. These studies also tend to
be critical of much of the methodology of energy efficiency
research and are skeptical about efficiency-gap claims, pointing
to empirical studies that suggest that claimed efficiencies are
often not achieved in practice. An example is a 2004 study by
two leading economists who examined Department of Energy
(DOE) audits of small to midsize firms and found that over half
of “engineering approved investments” were rejected because of
unaccounted-for costs.25
Although economists are skeptical about many energyefficiency-gap claims, they acknowledge that a gap can result
23. A 2015 working paper from New Climate Economy considered investment
opportunities in the world’s cities across three sectors; buildings, transport, and waste.
Gouldson et al., supra note 20. The authors’ preferred model found room for reducing 3.7
Gt CO2e by 2030 (carbon dioxide equivalent) at a net savings of $16.2 trillion (2015 value)
through 2015-2050. Id. at 16-17.
24. An example of an action that has both energy use externalities and investment
inefficiencies is the federal fuel economy standards. As Nadel and Langer note, investment
inefficiency accounts for most of the inefficiency addressed by these fuel economy
standards. See NADEL & L ANGER, supra note 20, at 4.
25. Anderson & Newell (2004).
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from market failures. Three forms of failure receive substantial
attention in the literature: imperfect information, split incentives,
and liquidity constraints and credit rationing. Imperfect
information exists when firms and households are unaware of
(or unable to verify) existing energy-efficient investments. 26
Split incentives exist when the agent responsible for making
investment decisions is not the one who will recoup the
benefits.27 One important instance of market failure, principalagent (PA) problems, arises from a combination of these effects.
For instance, two parties may contract in conditions of both
imperfect information and split incentives if one party (the
principal) has insufficient information to hold the second party
(the agent) accountable to the former’s preferences. 28 Finally,
liquidity constraints and credit rationing exist when agents,
having insufficient funds and limited access to credit, are unable
to afford the upfront costs of otherwise attractive investments.
An example would be a household that lacks the capital or
access to a lender to enable the purchase of a new heating and
cooling system, even if the lower energy costs of the system
would allow the household to recoup the initial investment
within several years. Although studies by economists have
identified reasons why investment inefficiencies might occur
and have generated empirical data to support the existence of
investment inefficiencies, on balance the literature emerging
from this camp casts doubt on the existence of a large efficiency
gap and does not attempt to quantify the size of the gap that it
believes does exist.
Although engineers and economists rarely engage directly
with one another in the literature, a 2012 exchange between
leading economists and efficiency advocates provides a valuable
example of the differences of opinion on the efficiency gap. The
26. Steve Sorrell et al., Barriers to Industrial Energy Efficiency: A Literature
Review 6 tbl.2.3 (U.N. Indus. Dev. Org., Working Paper No. 10/2011, 2011),
https://open.unido.org/api/documents/4817768/download/Barriers%20to%20industrial%20
energy%20efficiency%20-%20A%20literature%20review [https://perma.cc/J7YK-EWE4].
27. Id.
28. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, MIND THE GAP: QUANTIFYING PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PROBLEMS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 27 (2007), https:// www.iea.org/ publications/
freepublications/
publication/
mind_the_gap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ST7L-CCUH].
Principal-Agent problems in energy efficiency are often discussed under the heading of
landlord-tenant problems.
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exchange began with a paper in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives by economists Hunt Allcott and Michael
Greenstone, which concluded that “while investment
inefficiencies do appear in various settings, the actual magnitude
of the Energy Efficiency Gap is small relative to the assessments
from engineering analyses.”29 The paper did not provide an
estimate of the gap, but it suggested that many empirical studies
of investment inefficiencies were flawed for several reasons,
including that many of the studies did not involve rigorous
methodological design. Moreover, even where the energy cost
savings were clear the energy-efficiency investments were often
subject to “other unobserved costs and benefits” that were not
accounted for in the study. 30
Allcott and Greenstone concluded that engineering studies
thus may identify as investment inefficiencies decisions that are
actually rational responses to hidden costs and risk. These
hidden or unobserved costs include costs that are visible to the
household or firm but are not accounted for by the studies. One
instance of an important unobserved cost for households is the
difference in quality between energy-efficient and inefficient
goods, such as the comparatively harsh glow of fluorescent
lights as compared to incandescent ones. A form of unobserved
cost that may be particularly important to corporations is the
adoption cost associated with the search for and implementation
of energy efficient technology (e.g., disruptions to production,
staff replacement and training, etc.).31 In addition, risk occurs
when a choice could have multiple outcomes. The riskier the
investment, the more improbable the desired returns and the
larger the likelihood these investments will be discounted by a
rational agent.32
Although Allcott and Greenstone acknowledge that
consumers often lack information about energy use and that
investment inefficiencies occur, they conclude that “the
empirical magnitudes of the investment inefficiencies appear to

29. Allcott & Greenstone, supra note 15, at 25.
30. Id. at 5.
31. See Sorrell et al., supra note 26, at 6 tbl.2.3.
32. See Florian Knobloch & Jean-Francois Mercure, “The Behavioral Aspect of
Green Technology Investments: A General Positive Model in the Context of Heterogeneous
Agents,” 21 ENVTL. INNOVATION & SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS 39, 42 tbl.1 (2016).
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be smaller, indeed substantially smaller, than the massive
potential savings calculated in engineering analyses such as
McKinsey & Co. (2009).”33 In addition, given the heterogeneity
of consumer investment inefficiencies, they point out that many
broad energy-efficiency laws and policies (e.g., federal
appliance-efficiency standards) will benefit the consumers
subject to inefficiencies, but not those consumers that are not
subject to inefficiencies, suggesting that these measures should
be tailored to affect those consumers most subject to the
investment inefficiencies.34 Unfortunately, this kind of tailoring
can be a difficult task for policymakers.
A public or private policymaker might well conclude, based
on the Allcott and Greenstone critique, that initiatives targeting
the energy-efficiency gap are far less promising than the
engineering studies would suggest and are not worth a major
investment. In a departure from the stove-piped dialogue on
efficiency, though, energy-efficiency advocates Steven Nadel
and Therese Langer of the American Council for an Energy
Efficient Economy (ACEEE) responded quickly with a critique
of the Allcott and Greenstone study. 35 Nadel and Langer do not
pull any punches. They accuse the economists of being
“misleading” and suggest that the authors “selectively mine
available data to make their points, often ignoring other findings
in the various articles they cite.”36 For instance, they argue that
Allcott and Greenstone often use only the high-discount-rate
scenarios from the papers they review, emphasize the existence
of high imputed discount rates by retail consumers, and fail to
cite studies that suggest a lower discount rate. 37 A high discount
rate will tend to reduce the value of the efficiency gains, which
often occur over years or decades, and decrease the size of the
efficiency gap. Nadel and Langer identify weatherization and
utility demand-side management programs (such as programs to
increase the efficient use of electricity in households) as areas
that yield larger savings when the analysis uses discount rates
that are more realistic in their view.
33. Allcott & Greenstone, supra note 15, at 5 (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. See NADEL & L ANGER, supra note 20, at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2-4.
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Nadel and Langer also critique other aspects of the
economists’ analysis, including the treatment of split incentives
between landlords and tenants, conclusions about consumers’
lack of information regarding appliance energy use, and others.
For instance, as to the efficiency gap regarding motor-vehicle
fuel economy in the U.S., they take issue with the economists’
assumptions about the extent to which federal policies are
defensible based on investment inefficiencies, how consumers
value the cost savings from fuel efficiency and the extent to
which government efficiency standards push the development of
new technologies, inducing automakers to develop and supply
consumers with more efficient vehicles. They also claim that
the Allcott and Greenstone critique of government energyefficiency incentives and standards may be valid in perfectly
functioning markets, “but perfect markets are not the
environment in which energy efficiency policies are
proposed.”38

III. UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLOITING THE GAP:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE CLIMATE
GOVERNANCE
This is not the place to attempt to resolve the differences
between these authors or the camps overall. In addition, many
of their disputes are more relevant to discussions of the
desirability of particular types of government laws and policies
(e.g., taxes, cap and trade systems, and efficiency standards)
than to the efficiency gap issue that matters most for private
climate governance: understanding the extent to which a large
gap exists based on corporate, household and other private
sector investment inefficiencies, and thus whether private
initiatives face a low hurdle in trying to drive private sector
energy use and GHG emissions reductions. What does the
debate between engineers and economists suggest on this issue?
Is there reason to be optimistic or pessimistic about whether the
energy-efficiency gap arising from investment inefficiencies is
large enough to enable private climate initiatives to achieve
major near-term GHG emissions reductions? In my view,
several lessons can be drawn from the debate.
38.

Id. at 1.
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First, there is an urgent need to draw on the existing
literature to identify the magnitude of the investmentinefficiency-based component of the energy-efficiency gap.
Economists frequently point to shortcomings in non-price-based
approaches to the climate problem, but by now it is clear that
governments are unlikely to adopt the first-best approach at the
global or national level in the near term (a carbon tax). The
importance of reducing carbon emissions in the near term and
the pervasive government gridlock on climate policy suggest
that waiting for first-best solutions is not an adequate response
to the climate problem. 39 Instead, it is time to examine, develop,
and deploy the most promising second-best responses, and
private initiatives are an important, often-overlooked option.40
The energy-efficiency-gap estimates included in engineering
studies suggest that the billion-ton GHG target is not unrealistic.
Economists’ critiques suggest that the engineering studies
overestimate the gap, but economists have yet to develop their
own overall estimates of the size of the gap, so it is hard to know
whether the billion-ton target is unrealistic based on the
economics literature. It is time for an interdisciplinary initiative
to resolve differences between the camps where possible, and to
identify a range of reasonable estimates of the investmentinefficiency-based energy-efficiency gap that accounts for the
perspectives of engineers, economists, and other experts. The
literature generated by engineers and economists often assumes
that the audience is government policymakers, rather than the
private actors who are in a position to develop private energy or
climate initiatives. The range of reasonable estimates of the
investment-inefficiency-based
energy-efficiency
gap
is
important, however, because it could not only inform public
policymakers (e.g., federal, state and local government
managers), but also private policymakers (e.g., philanthropists,
advocacy group managers, and the managers of corporations,
39.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Macro-Risks: The
Challenge for Rational Risk Regulation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 401, 402, 430-31
(2011).
40. David G. Victor, Taking the Lead: Faced with Government Inaction, Private
Firms Emerge as Major Players in Climate Change Mitigation, 358 SCIENCE 1547, 1547
(2017) (reviewing VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3); see also Richard B. Stewart
et al., A New Strategy for Global Climate Protection, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 1-12
(2013).
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colleges and universities, and religious, civic, and cultural
organizations), about the overall priority that should be given to
efficiency-based initiatives as well as the most promising
specific energy-using actions to target.
Second, it is important to gather additional data to fill
important holes in our understanding of the investmentinefficiency-based energy-efficiency gap. Given the importance
of understanding the magnitude and specific features of the gap,
increased overall research support, and support of
interdisciplinary research in particular, is warranted. The
research could include efforts to provide an interdisciplinary
estimate of the investment-inefficiency-based gap and to
identify priority areas for additional empirical studies, with a
particular focus on identifying and quantifying unobserved costs
and responses to risk.
Third, because both the engineering and economics camps
tend to focus on corporations and households (often referred to
as consumers by economists), the discussion of the investmentinefficiency-based gap misses a number of sectors that are
important for assessing the opportunity for private climate
governance. For instance, religious organizations operate
numerous buildings, have large numbers of employees, and have
extensive supply chains, all of which contribute to carbon
emissions. These emissions occur at levels that are meaningful
on a global scale: Our back-of-the-envelope assessment of the
Catholic Church suggests that its worldwide emissions would
rank it among the top fifty countries in the world if it were a
country.41 Many private hospitals, colleges and universities, and
civic and cultural organizations also are substantial direct and
indirect GHG emitters. A complete analysis of the efficiency
gap should assess the size of the gap in these sectors and any
sector-specific barriers or opportunities.
Fourth, it is important to understand that efficiency
opportunities are valuable if they make efficiency investments
less costly, even if these investments still have some cost. To
support private climate initiatives, efficiency-gap research thus
should focus not only on whether inefficiencies exist that would
make behavior change profitable, but also whether inefficiencies
41.

VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at Ch. 9.
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exist that would lower barriers to behavior change to the point
where other drivers (reputational concerns, investor, lender or
supply-chain pressure, employee morale, social and personal
norms) become effective. Many private initiatives seek to
harness these other drivers, which may tip the balance in favor
of action if the monetary cost is low. For instance, a retailer
might find that replacing incandescent bulbs with more efficient
LED lighting reduces energy costs, but not to the point where
the discounted savings exceed the costs of installing new bulbs.
The lower costs might enable pressure concerning the firm’s
environmental reputation and ability to attract and retain highskill employees to tip the balance, however, inducing the retailer
to take the energy- and GHG-reducing step. The academic and
policy literatures do not provide a clear answer on the size of the
energy-efficiency gap that is defined not just by investments that
produce a net cost savings, but also those that substantially
lower the cost of reducing carbon emissions, even if there is still
some cost.
The fifth and final point relates to timing: To provide an
important opportunity for private initiatives, the inefficiencies
included in the energy-efficiency gap need not be inefficiencies
that would have remained in perpetuity or over many years. To
contribute to climate mitigation, private initiatives need only
accelerate the uptake of more efficient technologies and
practices, they need not induce firms or households to exploit
efficiencies that they would have never exploited. Some of the
inefficiencies that are potential targets of private climate
initiatives may well have been ferreted out and reduced through
market incentives at some point, but for the gap to be important
for the climate problem, private initiatives need only accelerate
the closing of the gap. This is true because time matters for
climate change: The longer we remain at elevated levels of
GHGs in the atmosphere, the greater the chance we will cross
thresholds that will make the problem much more expensive, if
not impossible, to address.42 Although economists typically
start with an assumption that markets are efficient, few would
argue that markets are instantaneously efficient, and the gap is
42. See, e.g., VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at Ch. 2 (analogizing
exceedance of GHG atmospheric levels as operating a car in the red zone on its
tachometer).
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important if it identifies areas where private initiatives can
accelerate implementation of efficiency measures that might
otherwise have occurred at a later date.

IV. CONCLUSION
If private governance efforts are to contribute meaningfully
to sustainability, they should be founded on realistic
assumptions about what motivates the targets of private
initiatives. Corporate and household motivations are often
complex and unclear, but we can be fairly certain that it is easier
to motivate behavior change if the desired action is profitable or
can be taken at little cost. This is particularly important for
private governance initiatives, since the driver of change is a
private entity that lacks the coercive power and resources of
government. Engineering studies suggest that a very large
energy-efficiency gap exists that could provide opportunities for
private governance initiatives, but studies by economists cast
doubt on the size of the gap. Given the important role of private
governance in responding to climate change, it is time to bridge
the disciplinary chasm and develop a much more reliable and
fine-grained assessment of the energy-efficiency gap.

